Comparative law is law's cybernetics, or "theory of messiness." It attempts to steer through the messiness of the foreign by reordering it into the language of the familiar without betraying the original. It is needed urgently in contexts of unrecognized metamorphosis, and today metamorphoses are burgeoning in murky areas outside of law's traditional categories of either the national or the international. The less apparent, the less visibly foreign, the foreign is, the more comparative law has a task of translation involving the formation of a vocabulary to transmit new configurations that resist detection and articulation. This essay examines the centrality of translation to processes of language and meaning construction, and links translation to comparative law as a model for the study of similarity and difference, the universal and the particular.
I. Introduction
At the simplest level of observation, language issues arise in connection to comparative law because people in different countries speak in different languages, producing legal texts in foreign languages that become the target of comparative legal studies. At the same time, English is gaining ascendancy, if not dominance, with international exchanges in the field increasingly conducted solely in that single language, whether in scholarly conferences, in journals targeting an international readership, or in university classes where professors and students do not share a native language. These matters of simple observation will be discussed in Part II, with some suggestion of how they relate to a deeper link between comparative law and language that is a principal subject of this chapter: namely, the study of language as a cognitive model for comparative law.
Part III discusses language's dependence on translation inasmuch as translation is the mechanism central to meaning construction, even within a given language. Part IV links translation to comparative law as a model for the study of similarity and difference, of the universal and the particular, and discusses them in terms of the contrasting categories that undergird the civil-and common-law legal systems. It also discusses how post-war comparative law scholars analyzed these subjects, explaining their rejection of the legal positivism that increasingly had marked legal theory from the nineteenth century until the Second World War.
Part V examines the post-war émigré comparative law scholars' immersion into a new language and legal culture, and how that experience informed their scholarly theory on issues of sameness and difference across legal orders. It then progresses to the generation that followed, whose divergence from the post-war perspective has reflected an increasing incorporation of postmodernist influences. The debate in comparative law over the relative importance of similarity and difference among legal systems has its counterpart in linguistics in conflicting views about whether commonalities among languages are fundamental or merely marginal. Part VI shows that these issues situate comparative law between deeply entrenched, mutually contradictory aspirations of universalism and pluralism which have stalked the evolution of both language and legal studies.
Universalism may seem to be on the ascendancy today, due to the globalization that vastly increases contacts in law without impediments from geographical distance; the widespread use of English as a means of facilitating communication throughout the world; and the increasing importance of non-national structures in law. Part VII discusses these phenomena in order to demonstrate that former domains of pluralism and difference indeed are receding, but that difference itself remains undiminished. Rather, its nature and provenances are changing, due to rapidly multiplying reconfigurations that characterize our time.
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Comparative law's challenge lies in deciphering significance amid reconstituting categories so as to unravel deceptive appearances, whether of unchanged legal significance surviving under a mask of change, or, conversely, of changed legal significance evolving under a surface that appears to remain static (Part VIII). In this task, comparative law's effectiveness as a translator of the foreign will depend on how well its acquired skills and methods can be adapted to new kinds of foreignness.
Part IX offers a concrete application of comparative law analysis as translator of current
European legal developments, and shows why comparative law is needed urgently today in a world in which law increasingly absorbs influences and ideas that have crossed national borders and have blurred traditional legal classifications.
The Conclusion section discusses comparative law's need for fluctuating methods and resistance to formulaic approaches as the field continually must reestablish its equilibrium in changing contexts. Comparative law's continuity is in the permanence of its location between the same and the other, an attribute it shares with language. This necessitates ongoing reconnoitering as the poles of sameness and otherness shift in form and substance, elusive to detection and prediction, requiring comparative law to undergo internal methodological metamorphoses in keeping with the metamorphosing world.
II. Simple Observations
Comparative law's most visible connection to language is due to different legal systems' legal texts being in different languages. Issues of foreign law's accessibility arise where comparatists are not fluent in the relevant foreign languages. If translations exist, corollary issues arise, such as whether a legal text can be studied productively in any language but the original.
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If fluency in the language of the target legal order is a prerequisite for comparative studies, comparatists necessarily will be limited in the range of legal cultures they can study by the foreign languages they know. Moreover, if foreign language knowledge is crucial, then even a polyglot comparative law scholar may not be able to communicate successfully to students who are unable to read foreign texts except in translation, thus reducing comparative law's educational potentials.
To the extent that translation is considered to be a viable option, how should translations be elaborated where a legal phenomenon has no exact equivalent in two languages? It is common in comparative law to translate certain words by approximation, so that, for example, the French word 'procès' generally is translated into English as 'trial', even though innumerable attributes associated with the French 'procès' are not attributes of 'trials'. Some authors add explanations to such effect in footnotes. The problem with this solution is that lengthy explanations will be necessary for a great many terms, making the translation of even a short legal text so cumbersome that it can not be achieved without an encyclopedic volume of explanation in footnotes.
One need only consider that if the French 'procès' is not a 'trial', it is in part that the French 'juge' also is not a 'judge', or at least that, if she is a 'judge', she only is so in some ways, but not in others. Further, if the French 'juge' is not entirely a 'judge', it is in part because the relevant 'cour' or 'tribunal' is not exactly a 'court', and so on and so forth, with virtually limitlessly connected concepts that are not quite equivalent when any word is translated. Thus, the explanatory footnotes will be unwieldy unless drastic short-cuts and omissions are made, which in turn, however, would leave readers with an exaggerated and misleading impression of similarity to their own legal systems.
An alternative approach is to leave in the original language words that translate poorly.
The appearance of a word or phrase in a foreign language and in italics will alert the reader to the irremediably foreign nature of the underlying concept. The obvious disadvantage of this technique, however, is that an untranslated word is not accessible to the reader in the absence of explanatory references. Thus, by leaving a word in a foreign language, a comparatist will succeed in conveying that the concept at issue is foreign and without exact equivalence, but will not in this manner transmit the concept.
Translation may appear to be a decreasing problem to the extent that English emerges as the single, dominant language of the field, with increasingly accomplished levels of fluency among those for whom it is not a native language. This would be an incorrect conclusion, however. The language of law is bound to the inner grammar of legal systems, cultures and mentalities, which in turn impede communication in words that are borrowed from another legal system, culture and mentality. As the rest of this chapter seeks to show, the complex comparative nature of language also characterizes law, making comparative law of paramount importance as a translator of law, but only so long as comparative law remembers that the comparative undertaking remains one of translation.
III. Plurilinguism , Imagination and Comparative Law
As chapter 16 (Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies) discusses, comparative law scholars today generally agree that the field encompasses the exploration of the nature of law in society, such that the examination of foreign law is an aspect of comparative legal scholarship, rather than its defining attribute. The more reconfigurations law undergoes in its dynamic interaction with a world in transition, the more comparative law must become a process of decoding legal presences that are like languages whose connotations change just as they begin to acquire meaning, languages in which all of the speakers are among the uninitiated.
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As this section discusses, the decoding process, whether of foreign language or law, is a process of translation. Understanding translation's mechanisms thus illuminates the processes of comparative law. Translation is both de-coding and re-coding, identifying and constructing meaning. Translating between languages involves vast networks of associations of a word in one language that can not all be transposed into the other, such that there must be loss of connotative significance in the process. At best, translation achieves an overlap of some meanings between two domains, as in an intersection of sets, but not total overlap, as in a union of sets. The extent to which translation can succeed is a matter of debate.
3 Similarly, the extent to which comparative law can succeed in communicating the other in law is a matter of debate.
Linguists and philosophers of language diverge on how communication takes place, and on whether any communication means, or can mean, an exchange of equivalent concepts.
Theories also range as to whether and to what extent all languages may share deep structures.
4
There is dispute as to how to define the concept of language. 5 Finally, and crucially, the status and role of language are not the same in every society and legal order. 6 In comparative law, analogously, theories range as to how to define law; whether too little equivalence links legal orders, such that they are not mutually communicable; or whether, on the contrary, law shares deep structures throughout the world. Also analogously to language, the status and role of law are not the same in every society.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to posit that there are irreducible untranslatables between languages. A vast and varied literature links the phenomenon of untranslatability to the conclusion that language uniqueness arises from, and in turn also fortifies, a unique world perspective, an irreproducible manner of seeing and understanding. 7 This attribute of language has significance for comparative law beyond the similarity of the field to translation.
It means that knowing a second language allows entry into another world, a way of seeing through another lens, into 'incommensurable systems of concepts'. 8 Consequently, for comparatists, knowing the languages of legal systems they study signifies access to all that the texts of law imply and connote, but do not state, to their infinity of links to the contexts that spawned them and that they also affect. It has been suggested that communication always lies beyond language. 9 The kind of openings to perspective, to ways of thinking and feeling, that an additional language offers, also allows one to intuit the nature of the closures and barriers to intercontextual understanding that are comparative law's greatest challenges, even before one locates, identifies, and learns to overcome the particular impediments in the particular study at hand.
The polyglot knows that much alterity is not apparent. The polyglot legal comparatist knows that legal orders reside as much beneath and aside from words as they do in the words 10 On Rabel, see Gehard Kegel, 'Ernst Rabel (1874 -1955 George Steiner, No Passion Spent: Essays 1978 -1995 (1996 The passage between discourses of difference that comparative legal analysis demands will be less well performed by monoglots because monolinguism deprives one of a rigorous training and insight into both detecting and conveying alterity that conscious translation endows.
Roland Barthes said that 'language is fascistic'. 21 The theoretical underpinnings for this stance have roots in natural law, thereby marking a reversal of course from the increasingly positivistic legal perspective of the pre-war era.
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As Nathaniel Berman has recounted, 23 faith in law as the primary, ultimate and durable solution to age-old barbarism also had inhabited the legal scholars of the interwar years, following the First World War. After the Second World War, it was revived by some of the very scholars who had had an opportunity to observe the fallibility of their views. Hans
Morgenthau described this phenomenon of repeat mistake with prescient irony as he observed the renewed article of faith taking form in the 1940s yet again, calling it an 'inveterate 24 Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law', (1940) rather, that for language, as for comparative law, the issue is one of balance.
V. Recent History

Languages and Comparative Law Theory in the Post-War Generation
The generation of comparatists immediately following the Second World War was steeped in many languages, products of classical educations strong in the tradition of 34 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Memories (Ugo Mattei , Andrea Prodi, eds, 2000) . 35 Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum Letzten: Tagebücher 1933 -1945 (1995 1996) nations, their immersion also was into the 'other' of the legal culture and mentality from the ones in which they had been trained.
Reading legal texts in their original languages was an obvious practice that did not figure as an explicit preoccupation of their scholarly writing about comparative law. Post-war comparative law thus was conducted by those who were well equipped to understand the nature of translation, the challenges to conveying meaning from one community to another, the disguises of the seemingly similar, and the depth and nature of differences.
Rudolf Schlesinger's memoirs, a book not intended either for publication or for a legal audience, was written to tell his American children and grandchildren of the trajectory their grandparents and great-grandparents had undergone, and to describe a European 'otherness' to American progeny. 34 It recreates the world of those whom Victor Klemperer in his diaries so aptly called 'Goethedeutsch'. 35 It also is a subtextual story of the legal translating which informed his methodological approach, and provides a glimpse into the generation of dualidentity comparatists that followed the Second World War. battle, as the government had foreseen the contest between the two legal regimes vying for supremacy, and had mandated that the palimpsest be construed exclusively through the ink from the Nazi presses if the texts that might seep through from the past otherwise would thwart political ideology.
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Schlesinger was experiencing a dual existence as an outsider permitted until 1939 to be a lawyer on the inside of the system that was starting to erase his own legal existence. 38 He had become a foreigner-native, advocating a law whose meaning was disappearing as it became an unintelligible archaism, cluttered with newly enacted contradictory principles, and as unchanged legal texts from the past transmogrified when they became subject to an altered system of judicial interpretation and definition.
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Schlesinger then recounts his steps in absorbing the common law and its bewildering language as a much confused '1-L' student at Columbia Law School after emigration to New York. One watches the seeds of understanding a new law and world germinating in a mind whose initial methodological approach mirrored the twin tenets of his native German legal training and mathematical mindset.
Schlesinger later was to develop the 'common core' approach to law, reflecting his dedication to human-wide universals as central to his vision of a transcendent tolerance. Numerous post-war comparatists shared this outlook. 41 That his analytical approach did not ignore differences of context as he engaged in finding commonalities that unite systems may be seen between the lines of his autobiography; in the enthusiasm with which he embraced and added to his common core theory Sacco's legal formants, those icons of contextual difference that are latent and elusive to detection; 42 and by his own statement at the end of his career that the search for differences also was crucial to the 'common core' project.
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As was the case for many of his colleagues of similar age and education, plurilinguism, both literally and figuratively, informed Schlesinger's scholarship and was central to it, without being an explicit part of the scholarly comparative project he elaborated.
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This meant, however, that the superb comparative skills of the polyglot and dual-identity comparatists were an unspoken component of their methodology, and that their comparative law scholarship transmitted ideas the next generation of students would be less well equipped to execute, other than those whose life experience had replicated immersion in more than one language and society.
Imre Kertesz wonders if one can get an idea of water from those who drink it. 45 The post-war generation drank directly from the sources. The challenge for comparative law is to 46 The Trento project, in reaction to such criticism, has explicitly rejected an a priori objective of finding commonalities. Mattei (2002) 
VI. Babel
Comparative law has experienced the debate over universalism and pluralism as consisting of mutually contradictory aspirations. As we have seen, the post-war generation put its plurilinguism at the center of its search for a universal language of law, an Esperanto to reconcile all of humanity. In this, it echoed the goal of a single law for all of civilization that Saleilles expressed during the first modern international congress of comparative law in 1900.
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Historically, language and law both have known relentless human aspirations towards a universalist perfection that would eliminate disorder. These continue today. In law, some of this may be viewed as the 'legocentrism' Günter Frankenberg coined to denote the perils of a field that inflates its own importance. 60 Those immersed in law have a tendency to suggest political and social solutions based on law. The principles of translation evoked above imply that comparatists will convey law poorly if they view it in isolation from the social, political, historical and cultural influences that inform it, and that create the environment of the humans 61 This should not be interpreted to contradict the view of Luhmann and Teubner that the field of law is to be understood as an autopoietic system. I mean, rather, that those who project law as a solution in areas to which law is not relevant ignore other fields at their peril precisely because of law's limitations. E.g., Niklas Luhmann, 'Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, ', (1992) language existed before God created the confusion at Babel to punish man. By the twentieth century, one sees in Gottlob Frege's work, and the beginning of modern philosophy of language, that the ideal of an entirely unambiguous language also is considered to be the key to discovering the nature and functioning of thought. 65 Eco tells us that an obsession with finding a single, redemptive, perfect, universal language is to be found in every culture in the world. 66 Steiner, like the postmodern legal comparatists, turns the Babel story on its head, seeking to resolve the mystery of the incommunicable. He explores how it is that many mutually incomprehensible languages persisted within geographical areas too small for distance to explain their multiplicity, and concludes in the tradition of Romanticism that language profusion is metaphoric of a human-wide desire to develop individual worlds of difference in which the enduring and productive richness of imagination can best flourish and be preserved for future fertility.
Steiner suggests that the value of particular languages is in being untranslatable, in not being subject to communication to the 'other'. Since to translate is possible only to the extent of shared elements in more than one language, in the measure that translation is It should be remembered, however, that no matter how immeasurable losses in difference prove to be, difference itself does not diminish. Rather, the terrains of difference shift, such that the importance of some of the differences that have mattered most in the past will recede. For comparative law, as the world globalizes, it is foreseeable that the field's traditional skills for grasping the nature of national, including language, contexts will be of decreasing usefulness in their particulars. The acquired skills will retain value to the extent that having developed those skills allows the field to adapt so as to perceive and interpret new orders of difference.
VII. Language Deflation and the Growth of the Non-National
Ours is an era of simultaneous language deflation and law inflation (see Part IX), both of which are eliciting considerable anxiety. 69 The increased dominance of English is a much debated topic in comparative law; in law; and in many other fields. Efforts to reverse or even halt the trend to use English seem to be as ineffective as efforts to defend any one language from foreign importations within it. Even autocratic rulers lack power to control language 70 Grossfeld, (n. In their ungovernable and independent paths, languages resemble nothing more than law, whose history also is one of resistance to stasis in meaning. As the humans who operate 82 J.M. Balkin, 'Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning', (1993) 25 Connecticut LR 869 ff. 83 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 27 (1946) . Very much in line with Cassirer, who was a political philosopher, were his contemporaries Hermann Kantorowicz and Eugen Ehrlich of the Free Law School, who emphasized the inevitable role of community values on the meaning of law due to, inter alia, textual gaps in the law, and language indeterminacy. 84 To put this in Luhmann 's terms (n.61), such interdisciplinariness refers to elements that the autopoietic system of law has absorbed, or others on which it depends. On the latter, see Gunther Teubner, 'How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law', (1989) 23 L and Society Rev. 727 , at 742 ('The dynamics of social differentiation force legal discourse to produce reality constructions of its own, but the very same dynamics make law dependent upon a multiplicity of competing epistèmes'.) 85 This was the fascination that Montesquieu's Persian Letters exerted on French readers in the eighteenth century, in the epistolary novel featuring visitors from Persia who described French mores. legal texts, it may be due to conscious subversion, but equally often to innocent, unknowing shifts reflecting an ever-changing 'constitution …written in the citizens minds' that, according to Ernst Cassirer, inevitably, perpetually and always changeably, determines law's meaning.
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The variables that affect the evolution of both language and law are innumerable, and originate in many non-linguistic and non-legal sources. Comparative legal analysis therefore can not help but be interdisciplinary if it is to be effective in understanding and conveying law. 84 The 0extent to which law's transitions elude detection is the extent to which they also preclude reaction and direction by legislators, regulators and educators.
VIII. Familiarity and Foreignness
Translating the foreign into the familiar ends by clarifying the familiar that one discovers also to be foreign. 85 For comparative law, this means clarifying one's own legal framework through perspectives the foreign adds to one's lens of vision. Franz Kafka renewed in the twentieth century ('I have hardly anything in common with myself') 87 and that Imre Kertesz generalized beyond the personal to the whole of the human race ('we have nothing in common with ourselves'), 88 as well as by scholars including Julia Kristeva in Strangers to Ourselves. 89 As a field that has specialized in examining the outside, the other, comparative law is situated to see the foreign in the familiar, so as to elucidate the familiar.
The divided self that confronts its own 'other' was the basis for Rousseau's social contract between the self-individual and the self-citizen. 90 It also became the foundation for Stuart Hampshire's conception of justice in heterogeneous western constitutional democracies.
Hampshire posited that no set of substantive values would be shared by all populations within the ever more diverse national communities of western democracies, such that justice systems can not legitimately impose any single set of substantive norms. Rather, the fair hearing should serve as the cornerstone of justice inasmuch as each individual has conducted internal hearings when in inner conflict, thereby creating ubiquitous recognition of the value and fairness of a system based on listening to each side.
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For Hampshire, the experience of the foreign 'other' within a fragmented, conflicted self is a defining human attribute, and a cause for celebration. Unlike the nineteenth-century poètes maudits who lived in an inner exile, exiles from lands of birth know language displacement and disruption as part of their experience of the foreign. Some, like Theodor Adorno, emigrate from their homeland because it is the unpleasant price they must pay for physical survival. Exile was so bitter for Adorno that he returned to Germany after the Second World War, explaining his return as the longing to be reunited with the language of his birth. 93 In this, he was in a tradition of German-Jewish writers starting with Heine, who declared that his fatherland was not Germany, but German, the language. 94 Adorno most famously said that the holocaust had transformed poetry, that ultimate tribute to the power and beauty of language, into barbarism. 95 Barbarism was the Greek word for foreign. For him, the familiar had become the foreign, irremediably altered in his manner of experiencing it. Adorno's remark was reminiscent of Walter Benjamin's view that barbarism is embedded in the very concept of culture, 96 and a forerunner of still others who foresaw the legacy of twentieth-century totalitarianism's abuse of language as the beginning of the end of language itself.
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According to Adorno, it is in the foreign and barbaric only that one can see the familiar: 'He who wishes to know the truth about life must scrutinize its estranged form'.
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Only the estranged, the barbaric, the 'other,' can be noticed because the familiar, taken for granted, becomes invisible. The estranged is a conduit to noticing the familiar because it is that which we are able to see. Zygmunt Bauman extends Adorno's and Benjamin's ideas by 99 Bauman writes of the inner logic of the modern nation state that consists of structures which load the dice towards genocidal conduct. The structures he identifies are not in and of themselves culpable, making their innocuous appearance all the more dangerous, since they relate causally to destructive state practices without being necessarily ill-intentioned. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (1989 Rather, what appear to be differences may be the germinated form of unsuspected seeds long implanted and embedded within the familiar. 99 Just as the study of metastasized cells can reveal previously unperceived functions of the normal, we can see in 'estranged forms' how the familiar carries the potential for its own dramatic metamorphoses, and thereby better identify the development of those potentials.
Once we understand that even the familiar is foreign, we also see that it is not just the 'other' which requires translation: so does sameness, since sameness masks alterity ('I is another'). Comparative law remains key to understanding law, our own and others', because of its habits and history, its accoutrements, because it is conversant in otherness, in approaching and dealing with the alterities of languages, histories, and legal mentalities. It is our best bet today, because it is the field with the biggest head start towards deciphering the peculiar newnesses of the contemporary legal world, in which law has become mobile and, it has been suggested, a product of exchange.
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Comparative law can begin the process of detecting the unseen that lurks beneath the seen if it can put to fruitful current uses its own history of venturing into contexts that enlarge the practitioner's cognitive grids, enabling the assimilation of information that can be processed no other way than by extending the limitations of imagination.
Law's messiness can not be reduced. If comparative law can be an effective translator, it may be by conveying messiness more accurately, thereby allowing for a deeper understanding of the ways in which law is changing, the subtle new associations and linkages occurring as old distinctions give way to new ones. In our globalizing world, the distinctions associated with geography, including statehood and language differences, are fading as English becomes ubiquitous and even nation states that have not restructured officially are dealing with non-national normative claims, entailing legal changes of a non-national nature. The struggle to understand legal phenomena that do not fit within the traditionally exclusive categories and nomenclatures of law: namely, the national or the international, extends to trying to identify a new vocabulary capable of encompassing the novelties, tentatively termed by some as 'transgovernmental'; by others as 'post-national', as unfamiliar phenomena continue to unfold in a dynamic of mutual interaction with the words that name them.
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Comparative law is the sleuth of significance, of legal meaning, and its old antennae, so carefully and painstakingly attuned to the sorts of hidden change that challenged past generations, now need to be adapted to unearthing new configurations. Its objective should be to become so pervasive that it disappears. Its greatest contribution would be to convince all those who analyze law today that comparative law must be part and parcel of their undertakings, and consequently to merge into invisibility by making itself part of a familiar that it permeates, shedding its own distinctiveness in a globalizing world which needs the methods and skills the field has developed to be infused into all forms of legal analysis.
IX. Translating European Law: Examples
Europe today is one of many arenas of legal change in need of comparative analytical methodology. much needed comparative analysis, however, filtering the foreign aspects of European court decisions through domestic legal frames of reference that result in distortion.
The failures of translating legal meaning in renditions of European court decisions tend to be exacerbated when the national legal publication and the country whose law was analyzed by the European court are not from the same legal system, as could be observed when a major
French legal publication excerpted and analyzed an ECHR decision in a case on assisted suicide that had originated in the United Kingdom. 105 The choice of which excerpts to reproduce from the lengthy European decision was the first step of inadvertent transformation of the European court decision in its presentation to the French reader, who typically would be following European law to the extent it is likely to impact a domestic legal practice, and would read European decisions only in the versions national legal publications publish.
In its manner of abridging the ECHR decision, the French publication did not just shorten the original; it expurgated the ECHR's common law analysis, thus omitting those portions of the ECHR decision that would have been inhabitual in a French court decision.
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These included ECHR reasoning by analogy among cases in their factual contexts. The French rendition preserved ECHR references to cases through factually decontexualized, normative principles more familiar to civilian legal thinking.
The scholarly analysis which followed the French rendition of the ECHR decision further magnified the failure to translate legal meaning from the European context to the domestic one, as it portrayed aspects of the court's decision as being substantively defective when in fact they reflected a common law manner of reasoning. Notably, the French scholar in civilian manner was indignant that the ECHR had referred with approval to UK policy that not 107 La Semaine juridique (n. 105) 682. For a fuller explanation of the civilian approach as withholding punishment but not prosecution, see Antoine Garapon, 'French Legal Cutlure and the Shock of 'Globalization', (1995) This pattern of change in Europe, coupled with the principle of subsidiarity, has led to a particularized drafting style, inhabitual and discomfitingly unfamiliar to the civilian legal public in its expectations of such language. 110 It is reminiscent of the detailed common law statute that similarly arose from a piecemeal system: namely, from the common law tradition of courts creating unenacted law by means of cases, and of the legislature's interference as being the exception rather than the rule, occurring only where the legislature wrests control over particular matters it deems necessary to take into its own hands from the a priori accepted ubiquity of judicial governance. 111 Part of the civilian frustration with perceived 'legislative inflation' in European member states today can be explained by its association with this suspect pattern of legal change that is experienced as the reverse of law's proper course from the whole to the particular.
Law profusion also recalls the fascist period, in which there was an explosion of statutes that undermined the prior rule of law through outer garments of legality veiling profound change and, as was later judged, abdication rather than preservation or promotion of law and rule of law. 112 The association between statutory abundance and the subversion of law also has roots that go back further in modern civilian legal thinking, as Portalis' explanation of the drafting of the French Civil Code reveal.
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Along with an ideal of keeping laws few in number, the sparse style of the civilian legal norm is considered inseparable from law and the rule of law because it is considered to have proven its ability to withstand changed circumstances. As exemplified by the Prussian code that failed before Napoleon's succeeded, 114 abundant language and abundant law are deemed fated to outlive the problems they address, entrapping society by legal texts that eventually bind senselessly, because they become helpless to resolve future problems time-bound legislators inevitably fail to foresee.
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The civilian view that legal quantity and linguistic specificity in enacted law cause 
X. Conclusion
Comparative law as translator can be envisaged as cybernetics for the irreducible messiness of legal concepts that are wedded to the language which encases them and to the connotations which adhere to them. The physicist Freeman Dyson describes cybernetics as 'a theory of messiness', 117 and its Greek etymology as evoking one 'who steers a frail ship through stormy seas between treacherous rocks'. 118 According to Dyson, the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, was a former child prodigy who became immersed in the cultures and languages of both pure and applied mathematics, engineering, and neurophysiology, and translated among all of them. Wiener determined that 'the messiness of the real world was precisely the point at which his mathematics should be aimed'.
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As this chapter has discussed, comparative law and its practitioners have long been interpretants attempting to steer through the messiness of the foreign by reordering it into the language of the familiar without betraying the original. Today's world of dizzying legal changes, and the accelerated rate at which changes are occurring, heighten comparative law's difficulties, even as the field increasingly finds itself implicated in world events.
Comparatists have ceased being remote from reality like the philosophers an empress once envied: 'You philosophers are fortunate. You write on paper, and paper is patient. I unlucky empress write on the sensitive skin of people'.
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As Ugo Mattei has been exhorting his colleagues to remember, scholarship is an important influence on European legal and political decision-making in this foundational period, and will affect millions of people for a long time to come. 121 In other parts of the world, new encounters of laws and legal norms occur, crossing borders of geography, statehood and, most confusingly, crossing traditional categories for law and legal meaning.
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Analyses and interpretations of interlocking, often mutually irreconcilable claims will affect decision-making as the reshaping world seeks to solidify emerging concepts of legitimacy and legality.
Comparative law tends to be least acknowledged and most often absent where legal analysis does not involve visibly divergent legal orders. It is needed urgently in contexts of unrecognized metamorphosis, however, and today metamorphoses are burgeoning in murky areas outside of the traditional rubrics of either national or international law. 123 The less 'To take so vast a step as to liberate oneself from the incubus of an entire system of symbols -and it is scarcely possible to distinguish symbols from thoughtsto shake oneself free of so obsessive a framework, requires genius and intellectual strength and independence of the highest order. The new construction, if it is created by a man of creative as well as destructive talent, has an immense and liberating effect upon his contemporaries, since it removes from them the weight of a no longer intelligible past, and a use of language which cramps the intellect and causes the kind of frustrating perplexity which is very different from those very real problems which carry the seeds of their own solution in their own formulation. The new system, born of an act of rebellion, then becomes a new orthodoxy, and disciples spring up on all sides, eager to apply the new technique to new provinces to which the original man of genius had perhaps not conceived of applying them. This is sometimes successful, [but] sometimes leads to a new and equally arid and obfuscating scholasticism. Once the new orthodoxy has won the day, this in its turn, by making concepts rigid, by creating an ossified system of symbols no longer flexible in response to the situations which had originally led to the revolt, creates new frustrations, new insoluble problems, new … perplexities.'
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As translator of legal meaning, comparative law always has had to invent and reinvent tools with which to translate. The paradox is that this undertaking, however descriptive in nature its ultimate objective may be, requires the ability to destroy its own past rigidities and manners of perceiving, its own methods of decoding and transmitting, in order to construct a new modality of analysis, a new vocabulary better adapted to changed contemporaneous meaning in the perpetually chameleon-like world of new presences, claims, standards and influences, in which the legal and extra-legal increasingly crisscross to the point of becoming indistinguishable, and whose junctures are the more difficult to perceive to the extent that they are unexpected. 127 Comparative law, like Berlin's rendition of philosophy, can and must maintain logical rigor, but it is the antithesis of final answers, of absolute truths, such that, in comparative legal analysis there can be 'no final method of dealing with problems'.
128
The field's strength lies in exposing law's complexities, and its tentacles lodged in every aspect of life. Comparative law's fragility is the fragility of law, a concept no sooner defined than changed in meaning. The discourse of law has been characterized as 'a creative http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art27 language, which gives existence to that which it articulates'. 129 Like the law of the 'other' it seeks to transmit, comparative law ultimately also is subject to the language in which it is couched, that gives it sense, and that, as Paul de Man believed to be the distinctive privilege of all language, is equally adept at hiding as at bestowing meaning. 130 It has been said that the distance 'between the same and the other [is] the gap in which language stands …' 131 This does not make language transparent or efficacious, honest or able.
Rather, it situates language and evokes its pitfalls and potentials. Like language, comparative law also stands in the gap between the same and the other. Like language, comparative law faces the stark pitfalls of miscommunication and misunderstanding, but, also like language, it possesses the unique and breathtaking potentials of learning to see, to communicate and to shed light in that elusive, inevitable, shifting and ever-reconfiguring gap between the same and the other. 
